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The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) is an office of both Houses of Parliament, providing independent, balanced and accessible analysis of research evidence related to public policy issues.
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Introduction

Brexit has dominated the headlines since the referendum of June 2016, and for good reason. Not only has the country embarked on a set of negotiations with the European Union almost unparalleled in their complexity and scope – as well as impacting profoundly on British politics – but Brexit itself will also affect virtually all aspects of the British economy and society.

This process of leaving the European Union also presents both challenges and opportunities for British social science. Examining and assessing developments as complex as those that are now taking place – in ‘real time’ – will not be easy. Frequently, this examination and assessment will require research that spans traditional disciplinary boundaries and involves collaboration.

But, equally, government and other interested groups have arguably never had such a need for timely, objective, research-based social scientific evidence and insights. The process of leaving the European Union will involve the recalibration of everything from the relationship between the British and European legal system, to the functioning of the British constitution, to the country’s political economy. Moreover, such research is needed not in decades but in the coming months and years.

The ESRC, to their credit, have understood that this opportunity exists. Their funding of 25 Brexit priority grants testifies both to the significance of the UK’s decision to exit the EU and to the important role that social science can and should play in informing that decision. Like all the funding provided under the UK in a Changing Europe initiative, it is intended not only to promote the highest quality research, but also encourage engagement with audiences such as politicians, policy-makers, business, civil society, and the general public.

If you feel that any of the research outlined here is of interest to you, I’d encourage you to contact us. While ESRC-funded research is designed with an eye to real world ‘impact,’ this programme maintains as a key priority the ambition of ensuring that wider society can benefit from its findings.

I look forward to working with you.

Anand Menon
We are a multi-generational, multidisciplinary and gender-balanced team of researchers from Loughborough and Queen Mary London universities.

Our project aims to inform the Brexit negotiations in real time via up-to-date, research-informed knowledge about the EU Member States’ Brexit positions and the Brussels negotiating environment.

The project is already tracking the Brexit negotiating positions and in particular the ‘red lines’ of selected member states (Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy) which during the project lifespan (April 2017 to September 2018) have held or are due to hold national elections.

The project also asks which forces - including emotions – are at work in Brussels to shape the EU’s negotiating position following the invoking of Article 50.

Through a network of partners and consultants, we’re casting our net as widely as we can to identify people who want and need to know about our research. We have planned events for 2018, each time with stakeholders who want to go behind the scenes in the EU27 and in Brussels.

**Our findings to date are twofold**

First, our study of the 2017 Dutch, French and German elections illustrates that Brexit was not a prominent theme in those countries’ electoral contests, and that even Eurosceptic populist parties did little to boost its salience. On the populist radical right the message on Brexit was nonetheless part of a broader Eurosceptic thrust that retains its potential to disrupt the political status quo: public support for European integration is notoriously shallow, and mainstream parties are influenced by their more extreme counterparts on the political spectrum.

Second, on the EU-27 negotiating positions, the main message coming from Brussels is that there is still not full clarity of what the UK wants from the Brexit negotiations – not just with regard to their short-term arrangements (status of EU/UK citizens; Northern Ireland’s border; exit bill) but also to the long-term (trade) relationships between the two actors. Officials in Brussels still fear that the often mentioned “have cake and eat it” approach is still a negotiating objective of the UK government. At the same time, there is still awareness that negotiations can always break down, although recent openings to an idea of a transition period have met the favour of most of EU members. There are diffuse expectations that the UK will continue to be subject to EU rules, institutions and financial obligations during the transition period.
The EU-27 (plus the Commission and the European Parliament) have shown a remarkable degree of unity, although a few (for the moment, relatively minor) cracks have started to appear (e.g., on financial services, and the strong but cautious lobbying efforts of the City of London, France has a notoriously harsh line, which might not be the position of several other interested countries).

Our findings to date have been published in numerous blogs and letters that you can read on our website: http://www.28plus.eu/#28-archive

Contact us

Professor Helen Drake, Chair of French and European Studies and Institute Director, Diplomacy and International Governance, Loughborough University London (responsible for French case study and for project leadership)

H.P.drake@lboro.ac.uk

Dr Nicola Chelotti, Lecturer in Diplomacy and International Governance, Loughborough University London (responsible for research on Brussels, Italy and on negotiations in theory and practice).

n.chelotti@lboro.ac.uk

Dr Borja García-García, Senior Lecturer in Sports Management and Policy, Loughborough University (responsible for project communications and links with civil society stakeholders).

B.Garcia-Garcia@lboro.ac.uk

Dr Elena Georgiadou, Lecturer in International Management, Loughborough University (responsible for research on negotiations and for links with stakeholders).

e.georgiadou@lboro.ac.uk

Dr Stijn van Kessel, Lecturer in European Politics, Queen Mary London (responsible for Dutch and German case studies).

s.vankessel@qmul.ac.uk
Project Overview

We are conducting an Internet panel survey of public attitudes toward Brexit. This means that we will be surveying the same individuals every 3 months for the next 18 months. At the end of our project, we will have 6 waves of data. Although each wave will comprise more than 3,000 respondents, not every respondent will participate in all 6 waves—due to people dropping out of the sample. But we expect to have at least 800 respondents who will participate in all 6 waves.

Our research objectives are threefold:

• To describe the variation in public attitudes toward Brexit, with a particular focus on individuals’ willingness to make trade-offs.

• To track changes in public attitudes toward Brexit over the course of the negotiations.

• To understand the factors that drive public attitudes, including demographic attributes (e.g., age), social identities (e.g., Remainer), and external events (e.g., macro-economic shifts).

Why the project is important

As noted, we aim to understand whether or not individuals’ attitudes toward Brexit are stable, and to what extent they are affected by events that may occur over the next 18 months. The fact that our study tracks some of the same individuals over time is therefore crucial.

Suppose that a major event occurs, such as Prime Minister Theresa May unexpectedly stepping down as Prime Minister. Such an event would be likely to have an impact on public attitudes. For example, given that the Prime Minister has so far adopted a relatively “hard” Brexit stance, her stepping down could be interpreted by voters as a failure of that stance. Consequently, there could be a rise in support for “soft” Brexit. Our data would allow us to identify exactly what sorts of people changed their views.

In addition, our data will allow us to gauge how much variation there is in individuals’ attitudes over the course of 18 months. This is important because, even when overall trends are relatively flat (e.g., a constant level of support for “soft” Brexit), individual voters may switch back and forth between different positions.

Finally, each wave will include a sizable number of people from all four constituent countries of the United Kingdom. This will allow us to document any differences that emerge between the priorities of English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish people.
Our findings so far

As of September 2017, we have collected and begun analysing our first wave of data. Preliminary analyses reveal that the data are of good quality: different demographic groups are represented roughly in the proportions that one would expect, and different variables are related to another in the directions and by the magnitudes that one would expect. We intend to publish two short reports early in October, one dealing with the so-called divorce bill, and the other dealing with freedom of movement.

Our first publication (28 August) was a report titled: ‘What sort of Brexit deal does the British public want? A review of the evidence so far’. This report, which was covered in The Guardian, did three things:

• Outlined the various possible deals that could be struck between the UK and the EU over the next 18 months.

• Reviewed the evidence that has been gleaned from polls and surveys so far about what sort of Brexit deal the British public want.

• Examined how support for “soft” versus “hard” Brexit has changed since the EU referendum by conducting a simple meta-analysis of polls.

Key dates for the project

Our project began in April 2017, and will finish in late 2018. As mentioned above, we aim to collect data on at least 3,000 people every 3 months for the next 18 months. During this time, we will be publishing a number of short reports dealing with different aspects of the negotiations, including: the divorce bill, freedom of movement, the Single Market, the Customs Union, and the UK’s border with Ireland. We also intend to publish a longer report summarising the full results of our research.

In addition to these reports, we intend to publish two or more academic articles, which we will submit to top-ranked journals. One of these articles will constitute a methodology paper dealing with the reliability of internet panels for studying attitudes to immigration. The others will focus on specific empirical findings that emerge during the course of our project. For example, we are currently developing a survey experiment that we hope to implement in the second wave.

Contact us

Principal Investigator:
Professor Anthony Heath
anthony.heath@nuffield.ox.ac.uk

Researcher:
Dr Noah Carl
noah.carl@nuffield.ox.ac.uk

Co-Investigator:
Dr Lindsay Richards
Email: lindsay.richards@nuffield.ox.ac.uk

Researcher:
Mr Robert McNeil
Email: robert.mcneil@compas.ox.ac.uk
About the project
This is a collaborative ESRC-funded research project between the Law Schools of Queen’s University Belfast and Ulster University and the region’s leading human rights organisation, the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ). Our project examines the constitutional, conflict transformation, human rights and equality consequences of Brexit.

Northern Ireland (along with Scotland) voted to remain in the European Union (EU); it is the region of the United Kingdom (UK) most likely to be negatively affected by the decision to leave the EU.

Many complex questions are arising, with significant legal and constitutional consequences that demand considered reflection. This new initiative aims to meet this need by disentangling the legal elements of Brexit with regard to Northern Ireland, and presenting and communicating the related implications for policy and practice in user-friendly formats.

Brexit and the peace process

Select Key Issues:
• Referendum & decision to leave ignored all-island character of the peace agreement
• UK & Ireland’s common membership of EU was an assumption in the Good Friday Agreement (GFA)
• EU law regulates powers & legislative operations of devolved institutions

Select Recommendations:
• Amend Withdrawal Bill to make British-Irish Treaty underpinning BGFA legally enforceable & to retain EU Charter of Fundamental rights as enforceable
• Prohibit immigration controls on the border
• Guarantee equivalence of rights on either side of the border

North-South relations

Select Key Issues:
• Disruption of equality of UK & Irish citizenship
• Threat to freedom of movement across the island
• Threat of continuing cross-border bodies (e.g. North-South Ministerial Council)

Select Recommendations:
• Agreement should be made between UK & Ireland, supported by all EU member states, that NI should be a “free zone” where EU citizens enjoy same rights (e.g. of entry, work, residence etc) as present
• EU should allow all UK & Irish citizens resident in NI rights of EU citizenship
• North-South bodies should be protected & their roles re-affirmed by UK & Ireland

**Border controls and free movement**

**Select Key Issues:**

• Powers under 2014 & 2016 Immigration Acts will likely lead to subcontracting immigration controls to other public & private actors (e.g. private landlords, banks, hospitals, employers)
• Danger that Ireland becomes “proxy” for racist/restrictive UK immigration policy
• Brexit undermines British citizen’s rights under GFA to equality with Irish citizens in NI

**Select Recommendations:**

• ‘Equality of citizenship’ model requires ongoing Freedom of Movement rights for British citizens in NI be negotiated with EU
• Enshrine continued freedom of movement in NI Bill of Rights
• Prohibit placing immigration controls on private or other public sector actors in NI

**Xenophobia and Racism**

**Select Key Issues:**

• The rise of xenophobia and racism linked to the referendum and the implementation of the outcome
• The problematic use of citizens’ rights as a ‘bargaining chip’ during the negotiations
• The problem of racial/ethnic profiling on the island of Ireland and within the UK

**Select Recommendations:**

• The need for clear safeguards in domestic law and as part of the Withdrawal Agreement on human rights and equality
• Effective laws and policies to challenge racist hate crime and racial discrimination

**Socio-economic rights**

**Select Key Issues:**

• EU has acted as a driver for equality law during difficult periods/for controversial issues such as sexual orientation equality
• Withdrawal Bill does not include any explicit saver for equality or socio-economic rights
• Presumptive loss of access to CJEU

**Select Recommendations:**

• Withdrawal Bill should provide explicit protections for EU standards in areas of equality & discrimination, workers’ & environmental rights
• In absence of EU framework for protection equality, petition of concern system should be reformed to minimise potential to stymie protection of equality rights

**Wider human rights and equality issues**

**Select Key Issues:**

• EU has played substantial role in promoting economic & social development of NI & in particular cross-border cooperation in these areas
• Nothing formally in Withdrawal Bill which precludes UK government from reducing protections related to equality & other rights
• Loss of Charter of Fundamental Freedoms and uncertain future of Human Rights Act

**Select Recommendations:**

• Position of Charter of Fundamental Rights in Withdrawal Bill should be same as other retained EU law
• Urgent need to consider Bill of Rights as mechanism to ensure NI authorities respect range of rights in EU law
• Clarity of support for NI economic, social development & reconciliation initiatives

**Contact Us**

For more information about the project please visit our website and social media accounts.

Website: www.brexitlawni.org
Twitter: @BrexitLawNI
Facebook: www.facebook.com/brexitlawni/
For general inquiries, our team can be reached at:
brexitlawni@qub.ac.uk
Objectives

The key objective of this project is to contribute to the ongoing public debate about Brexit and UK immigration policy, in particular the implications of Brexit for the current arrangements for free movement of workers within the EU; and the resulting economic (and political) implications for the UK.

- **Options for a new post-Brexit immigration system** Brexit is likely to result in the most far-reaching changes to the UK immigration system since (at least) the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962. As yet, there is little or no detail on what a new system might look like. As the Brexit process and negotiations progress, we will provide a comprehensive analysis of the possible options and of the (political, administrative and legal) feasibility of proposals from the government and others.

- **Legal and administrative implications** Changes to free movement will have implications that go well beyond what happens at the UK’s borders, or indeed the immigration system itself. They will require profound changes to UK law, in particular employment law, and on our current system of labour market regulation. Equally the position of UK citizens in the remaining EU will change. We will aim to explore and explain these implications, in particular how they are likely to affect employers, businesses and individuals.

- **Economic and labour market impacts** Changes to free movement and the broader immigration system will have significant effects on the UK economy and labour market. We will aim to produce assessments of these economic and labour market impacts, moving beyond the necessarily broad-brush approaches of previous analyses.

- **The interaction with other aspects of Brexit – in particular trade in services** The Brexit debate so far has tended to regard trade and migration as two separate issues – linked politically, but not economically. But trade in services and free movement of workers are closely related, practically, legally and economically. We will explore the interactions between the two; the implications for future trading arrangements between the UK and EU; and potential broader impacts on key sectors.
Timeline and outputs

We have been and will be producing regular blogs and briefing papers on all of these topics, for example:

- The progress of the negotiations on the rights of EU citizens residing in the UK and UK citizens elsewhere in the EU;

- Trends and developments in migration to and from the UK, especially of EU citizens; the economic and fiscal implications of these developments;

- Options and issues related to the post-Brexit immigration system, in particular the government’s forthcoming White Paper and immigration bill;

- Options for the modification of free movement in the event of the UK government seeking to remain within the Single Market/Customs Union for an “interim” period or on an extended basis.

Some recent examples of our commentary can be found on the ukandeu.ac.uk website, as well as in the press:

We also expect to be speaking regularly at academic and policy-focused events, and testifying before Parliament (and possibly the European Parliament), as all of the project leads have been doing throughout the post-Brexit period.

Contact us

We are all happy to be contacted by MPs, researchers and Parliamentary staff, either to provide formal evidence and testimony, or for more informal briefings or discussions.

Professor Jonathan Portes -
Jonathan.portes@kcl.ac.uk

Professor Catherine Barnard
csb24@cam.ac.uk

Professor Steve Peers
speers@essex.ac.uk

Madeleine Sumption
Madeleine.sumption@compas.ox.ac.uk
Brexit and Environment

We are a group of researchers interested in the ways in which the environment and associated sectors will be affected by the United Kingdom’s (UK) decision to leave the European Union (EU). Our aim is to engage with stakeholders from across the UK’s four nations, in order to produce feasible options and scenarios, and to map out the possible future contours of environmental governance.

Why the project is important

Protecting our natural environment requires transboundary co-operation within the UK and with our European and international partners. UK environmental policy has been profoundly shaped by membership of the EU. The principles underpinning policy (such as the precautionary principle) and the goals and targets of environmental policy have all been set at the European level. As environmental policy is a devolved competence, the UK’s imminent departure from the EU raises questions about the future arrangements for environmental governance. Brexit also raises issues about the way in which future environmental policy will be developed, implemented, monitored and enforced. The final shape of the withdrawal agreement will have ramifications for a range of sectors that are currently regulated via EU environmental product standards (such as chemicals and pesticides). Many of our international commitments, for example in relation to climate change, have been negotiated via the European Union.

Brexit consequently raises a number of questions about the principles that we want to use to develop our environmental policy, the level at which standards should be set from an environmental and trade
perspective, and the way in which policy should be designed, implemented, monitored and enforced. Who decides and for which jurisdiction? Do we need common standards across all of the UK? Do we have sufficient capacity to ensure policy is meaningfully implemented?

We are gathering information and data from stakeholders from across the UK on these issues in order to develop scenarios for future environmental governance within the UK.

Members of the team have given evidence to parliamentary enquiries on the implications of Brexit and we have developed a range of reports and publications. You can find further details, existing publications and regular blog posts on our website:

www.brexitenvironment.co.uk or follow us on twitter (@Brexitenv)

**Contact us**

Research Leader: Prof. Charlotte Burns, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, S10 2TU.  
Charlotte.Burns@sheffield.ac.uk

Project Researcher: Dr Fay Farstad  
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, S10 2TU,  
F.Farstad@sheffield.ac.uk

Co-Investigators: Prof. Neil Carter, Politics Department, University of York, York, YO10 5DD.  
Neil.Carter@york.ac.uk

Prof. Richard Cowell, School of Geography and Planning, University of Cardiff, Cardiff, 2CF10 3WT.  
CowellRJ@cardiff.ac.uk

Dr Viviane Gravey, School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, BT7 1NN.  
Viviane.Gravey@qub.ac.uk

Prof. Andrew Jordan, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ.  
A.Jordan@uea.ac.uk

Prof. Colin Reid, Dundee Law School, University of Dundee, Scrymgeour Building, Park Place, Dundee, DD1 4HN.  
C.T.Reid@dundee.ac.uk

**Timeline**

We have held two stakeholder events so far (in Wales and Scotland), and have a further event planned in Belfast (on 30th November 2017) and in London (February 2018). Alongside these events we have also been interviewing key policy-makers and policy-shapers. We will launch the findings of our research at events across the UK in the Spring 2018 and anticipate policy scenarios being available by Summer 2018.
Project Overview

In order to address the question - “What are the economic impacts of Brexit on the UK’s sectors, regions and cities?” - it is necessary to adopt different research approaches and very different data to what are currently being referred to in mainstream debates.

Almost all discussion regarding the economic impacts of Brexit is currently framed in terms of impacts on the UK as a whole or on the four nations of the UK. However the economic impacts are likely to be much more complex and differentiated at the level of the UK’s sectors, regions and cities.

Yet, it is these differentiated impacts which together produce the national impact, because the UK’s national economic performance is heavily shaped by differentiated economic behaviour and performance of its sectors, regions and cities. Therefore, understanding the national economic impacts of Brexit, and potentially mitigating any adverse impacts at the local level via specific policies, also requires a detailed understanding of the impacts of Brexit on the UK’s sectors, cities and regions.

In particular, the economic impacts of Brexit on the UK’s sectors, regions and cities are likely to be very different depending on four issues, namely: (i) the nature of the UK’s post-Brexit trade agreements with both the EU and the WTO, including any transitional agreements with both organisations; (ii) the regional industrial and trading structures; (iii) the impacts of Brexit on both the national and regional competitive positioning including that of both the UK and the individual region’s competitor regions (iv) the changes in local development policy and governance settlements induced by leaving the EU. All four of these issues need to be examined in detail in order to identify the likely effects of Brexit on each sector, region and city, as well as the UK as a whole. The UK’s patterns of trade with the EU vary significantly across the UK’s sectors and regions. These differences will also impact on many local firms which themselves do not export, even if they are not aware of this.

In order to do this our project is structured around three Work Packages.

Work Package 1 analyses the likely GDP and wage-income effects on the UK and also other EU countries implied by each of the possible alternative trading arrangements which might emerge after the UK-EU negotiations and the UK-WTO negotiations, including any UK-EU or UK-WTO transitional arrangements. By employing the most recently-released data from the 2016 WIOD World Input-Output Database we are able to examine the trade-demand effects of any changes in the global value-chains (GVCs) in which UK is embedded. This is important because Brexit implies that global value-chain structures of all UK sectors are likely to be significantly altered in the coming years and in very different ways and yet these GVC effects are almost entirely hidden by standard trade statistics. Using the WIOD data we can calculate the required scale of growth required in non-EU markets to compensate for any UK-EU losses, and we can do this sector-by-sector and country-by-country.
**Work Package 2** undertakes a competitiveness analysis of UK regions in order to examine their likely economic resilience in a post-Brexit context. Our work exploits the EU interregional trade and spatial-competition datasets developed by PBL Netherlands, and these datasets allow us to identify the key competitiveness drivers of UK and EU regions. In particular, they allow us to observe where the key European markets for UK regions are sector-by-sector, and to decompose the components of growth (or decline) of a region according to whether the growth (or decline) is because of generic rising (or declining) demand for their products and services, and/or because of a strengthening (or weakening) of their structural and competitive positions. Combined with an analysis of the region’s assets, we are able to identify the major contributors to the individual region’s post-Brexit resilience or vulnerability.

**Work Package 3** builds on our empirical findings in order to develop region-industry-specific case studies examining the likely financial, governance and institutional impacts associated with Brexit at the city, regional and local context. In order to do this we will share with the case study participants and stakeholders our emerging empirical findings from the first two work packages. This will help to motivate thinking, reflection and discussion and to elicit responses and ideas from the different local stakeholders regarding policy options and priorities. By mapping how these policy discussions on local competitiveness, governance and policy options relate to our empirical findings, we are therefore able to identify the extent to which these locally-emerging governance and policy views and ideas are aligned with the likely empirical realities.

**Importance of the Project**

Firstly, as yet there is almost no regional, city or local component to Brexit discussions, except regarding The City and the devolved administrations, even though the impacts are likely to be very different in different parts of the UK. Our work brings the analysis of Brexit to these city, regional and local levels.

Secondly, the deep engagement of UK firms in cross-border global value-chains (GVCs) which involve widespread re-exporting and re-importing means that most of the effects of Brexit on the UK economy cannot be understood by observing simple trade statistics or by discussions regarding UK-EU trade surpluses or deficits. Only the techniques we employ can tell us these things.

**Research Findings**

Our first major research finding concerns the level of economic exposure to Brexit-related risks for each of the UK and EU regions and countries. We find that all UK regions are far more exposed than regions outside of the UK, except for Irish regions, whose levels of exposure to Brexit-related risks are similar to the least exposed UK regions, namely London and the northern Scotland regions. These risk-exposure imbalances are also reflected at the national scale, where the UK as a whole is far more exposed than any other EU country in continental Europe and far more exposed than the rest of the EU as a whole.

**Key Dates**

First journal publication expected January 2018, and on-line early view by December 2017

Seminars with key city and regional stakeholders expected to commence in January 2018

**Contact us**

Professor Raquel Ortega-Argiles (coordinator),
City-REDI Institute, Birmingham Business School,
Ash House, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK

R.OrtegaArgiles@bham.ac.uk

Professor Philip McCann,
University of Sheffield Management School: Co-Applicant

p.mccann@sheffield.ac.uk

Professor Bart Los,
University of Groningen

b.los@rug.nl

Professor Frank van Oort,
Erasmus University Rotterdam

vanoort@ese.eur.nl

Dr Mark Thissen,
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and Research Fellow, Erasmus University Rotterdam

mark.thissen@pbl.nl
Project overview

With universities contributing some £39 billion net to the UK economy, and UK Higher Education enjoying an unparalleled international reputation, it is imperative that policymakers and Higher Education professional bodies approach the challenges posed by Brexit with the best and most up-to-date evidence possible. In an unpredictable policy environment, ‘Brexit, trade, migration and higher education’, an 18-month research project under the aegis of the ESRC’s ‘UK in a Changing Europe’ initiative, seeks to investigate senior management and academics’ perceptions of the key implications of Brexit for their higher education institution (HEI), and how universities are responding to the current challenges and opportunities. The challenges include research funding and capacity, attracting and retaining EU staff, international student recruitment, financial management and sustainability, risk management, data analysis, strategy and institutional decision-making. The project provides a research-based platform for monitoring this fast-changing area and a forum for foregrounding fruitful strategies and solutions.

Why the project is important

Contributions of educational exports to UK economy

International higher education is taking on an ever-greater economic importance. British higher education is the fifth-largest export sector in the UK. From £18 billion (US$23 billion) in 2012, educational exports are expected to reach £30 billion (US$38 billion) by 2020 (Treasury, 2015). UK Higher Education’s ability to achieve this target will largely depend on how it continues to remain attractive to EU and international students.

Financial sustainability of HEIs

Income from tuition fees is equivalent to nearly half (48.4 per cent) of British universities’ total income. In 2015-16, 22 British universities depended on fees for more than three-quarters of their total income. International tuition fee income represents a significant proportion of the total income of many British universities, and in many prominent universities the income collected from international fees overtakes that of domestic fees (Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Imperial, LSE, Manchester, Oxford, St Andrews, UCL, etc.).
Openness and global reputation

Arguably, British HEIs are the most global of all British institutions. This is the outcome of: decades of concerted branding initiatives; teaching and research excellence; and extensive engagement in European and international collaboration and mobility as key part of the business of science. The reputation of UK HEIs, as well as perceptions of Britain as a tolerant, welcoming and open society are key magnets for both international student choice and a talented academic workforce within increasingly competitive Higher Education markets.

EU high-skilled migration and Excellent Science

EU staff represent 17% of the UK academic workforce. In the past decade, their recruitment has expanded considerably, with approximately 40% of new posts filled by EU nationals (HEFCE, 2016). The reliance of members of the Russell Group (RG) on EU staff is even higher than the sector’s average, with EU nationals making up one fifth of the academic workforce (RG, 2016). EU academics are more likely to be submitted to the Research Excellence Framework (REF) (HEFCE, 2016), while more than 50% of the highly competitive and prestigious European Research Council Consolidator Grants awarded to UK universities (worth up to £2 million each), were won by EU academics (RG, 2016).

Research design

The research will consist of institution-level case studies in a selected group of twelve HEIs, representing sector differentiation in status, resources and levels of European engagement, as well as from across the four UK nations. The universities are located in England (eight universities), Northern Ireland (one university), Scotland (two universities) and Wales (one university). This sample also includes two specialist institutions. HEIs are situated within communities, and R&D networks, and so the research is also addressing the implications of Brexit for stakeholders, cities and localities.

Key dates for the project

Case studies of 12 universities are being conducted between October 2017 and April 2018. Public dissemination and discussion will be organised in liaison with the ‘UK in a Changing Europe’ project. Two one-day national seminars will take place respectively in March 2018 and October 2018. CGHE will disseminate regular two-page Policy Briefings on higher education and Brexit. The first published policy briefing addressed EU research programmes, Erasmus+, and the free movement of staff and students. Project findings will be published as CGHE Working Papers, presented in user-friendly language and will be widely distributed and publicised.

Contact us

This project is based at the ESRC/HEFCE funded CGHE, directed by Professor Simon Marginson, located at the UCL Institute of Education. The Principal Investigator is Simon Marginson. Co-Investigators are William Locke, CGHE Deputy Director; and Dr Vassiliki Papatsiba, Director for the Study of Higher Education, School of Education, University of Sheffield. Postdoc researcher is Dr Ludovic Highman, Senior Research Associate at the CGHE. Interviews will be conducted in each case study HEI by at least one of these researchers, normally two. See:

http://www.researchcghe.org/about/researchers/simon-marginson/

http://www.researchcghe.org/about/researchers/william-locke/

https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/education/staff/academic/papatsibav

http://www.researchcghe.org/about/researchers/ludovic-highman/
Project overview:
This project will estimate the potential effects of a selected number of UK agricultural and trade policy (UKAP) scenarios following Brexit. The research focuses on the possible economic consequences of Brexit throughout the agricultural sector including supply, demand, prices, exports, imports and economic welfare. The project will also assess the impacts of the selected Brexit scenarios on farm production decisions, the economic performance across major farm types and the welfare of farm households. It will provide the UK Government, its devolved administrations and other practitioners with cohesive and robust analysis to support future agricultural policy development and decision making. Researchers will be modelling scenarios using data from the UK Farm Business Survey, working with experts using the well-established FAPRI-UK sector model and a multi-region computable general equilibrium model.

Why is this project important?
The UK agri-food system will be one of the sectors most seriously affected by Brexit. Not only is the sector reliant on trade relations within and beyond the EU, it is also heavily dependent upon migrant labour and is currently heavily subsidised and regulated under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Synthesis of existing data, engagement with people from the industry and some new, short-term research are urgently needed to support and inform negotiations and policy development during and following Brexit. There is currently a gap in this knowledge, with no substantive research capacity to assess and explore possible effects of different trade and policy outcomes for the UK and its devolved administrations, and very limited “joining up” of expertise to provide cohesive analysis of Brexit scenarios for UK agriculture. This project aims to plug the gap and thus:

- Provide a deeper and more detailed understanding of the implications of potential scenarios that parliamentarians can apply in considering future policy affecting the agri-food industries, UK food security and European and global trade.
- Provide information to industry bodies such as the AHDB and NFU about potential scenarios and outcomes post Brexit, in their role as representatives of the agricultural industry.
- Provide consumers, retailers, farmers and workers in the agri-food industries, with information about the potential outcomes of policy decisions that could affect their economic and social welfare after Brexit.
- Examine in some detail the possible effects of policy decisions on farm households in the more vulnerable sectors of the industry, such as hill farming.

Progress and findings to date
The project is divided into five major steps:

**Phase 1:** Developing UKAP scenarios following Brexit through consultation and engagement with relevant stakeholders (April - May 2017)

**Phase 2:** Applying and comparing general and partial equilibrium models and providing aggregate projections of the impacts of the scenarios on UK agriculture at the sector level. (May – December 2017)
Phase 3: Assessing the impacts of UKAP scenarios on farm production decisions and financial performance across the distribution of holdings within major farm types in the UK. (June 2017 – January 2018)


Phase 5: Reconciliation and interpretation of the macro, sector and farm level results, and their implications for UKAP post Brexit. (December 2017 – September 2018)

Phase 1: Completed
Following direct consultation and engagement with relevant stakeholders we identified and agreed to model three general trade relation scenarios designed to cover the range of possibilities which appear (Summer 2017) to embrace the potential outcomes of the UK/EU negotiations:

- **Brexit-Lite**: A comprehensive UK/EU Free Trade Agreement, with UK-EU tariffs at zero. It envisages the UK’s departure from the Single Market, and raises the possibility that there would be some additional costs affecting UK/EU trade. This scenario can be considered as a possible transition agreement.

- **Brexit-Comp**: To reflect comprehensive trade agreements between the UK and the Rest of the World (RoW) after Brexit, this scenario adds elimination of all tariffs between the UK and the RoW (an obviously extreme free-trade scenario), in addition to continued free trade with the EU.

- **Brexit-WTO**: It reflects the potential for no agreement being in place by March 2019, and ‘reversion’ to WTO rules thereafter.

**UK Agricultural Policy**: Brexit implies that the UK, and the devolved administrations, will need to reconsider the framework of agricultural policy, currently determined by the EU Common Agricultural Policy. Given the complexity of CAP our key agricultural policy focus concerns its Basic Payments. We will model the elimination of CAP direct payments over a 5-year period (2020-25) with lump-sum compensation [say 5 years’ value] to at least some existing farmers.

**Phase 2, 3 and 4. Work in progress.**

Timeframe for the project:
The project was launched in April 2017 and will be completed on 30 September 2018.

The project will produce a range of publications for academic and general audiences including:

- Several short reports expected to be available from spring 2018 onwards.
- Policy and practice notes in an established Centre for Rural Economy series, designed for a general audience and produced in consultation with advisory board members and other stakeholders, will be available during summer 2018.

We will close the project with an interactive workshop for all interested parties, to be held under the auspices of the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board in September 2018.

**Contact us**
Principal Investigator: Dr Carmen Hubbard, Senior Lecturer, Centre for Rural Economy, Newcastle University, carmen.hubbard@ncl.ac.uk
Professor Emeritus David Harvey, Newcastle University, david.harvey@ncl.ac.uk
Dr Michael Wallace, Senior Lecturer in Farm Business, Newcastle University, michael.wallace@ncl.ac.uk
Charles Scott, Manager of Farm Business Survey (Northern England) charles.scott@ncl.ac.uk
Dr Shailesh Shrestha, Agricultural Policy Analyst, Scotland’s Rural College, shailesh.shrestha@sru.ac.uk
Dr Myles Patton, Principal Economist for FAPRI-UK model (Northern Ireland), AFBI, myles.patton@afbini.gov.uk
Anne Liddon, Science Communications Manager, Centre for Rural Economy, Newcastle University anne.liddon@ncl.ac.uk
BrExpat* examines the implications of Brexit for the 1.2 million Britons living in the EU27. It documents how Brexit—as it unfolds—is experienced by Britons resident across the EU27. As political rights, social and financial entitlements are negotiated, it examines how these Britons understand their identities, their sense of belonging, and their futures.

The project predominantly produces rich qualitative data. It includes in-depth case studies working closely with Britons living in France and Spain (which host the largest numbers of Britons), including 100 semi-structured interviews; and a 12-month long citizens’ panel modelled on Mass Observation, engaging 100 Britons living around the EU27 to respond to a series of directives. These elements of the research will produce real-life testimony of the impacts of Brexit on the lives of these Britons, highlighting how it is variously experienced, and demonstrating the diverse outcomes for their lives. It also includes expert interviews with institutional actors in Britain, the European Commission and within EU member states about changing responsibilities for these citizens. In this way, it seeks to gain detailed knowledge of how the consequences of Brexit for these British populations are understood, communicated, managed and mediated by those with legal and civic responsibilities for such populations. Finally, the project includes a close analysis of how Britons living in the EU27 are represented in the media, positions papers, and the negotiations.

**Remembering the British in the EU27**

There are 1.2 million Britons living and working in the EU27. This is a diverse population—including families (at times dual national families) with children, young people seeking work and educational opportunities, as well as those who have retired to other European Union countries. The motivations for having moved to the EU27 that might include, work, love, education or, indeed, a combination of these.

Freedom of movement—a right granted through their European Citizenship—was a significant factor in facilitating the migration and settlement of these populations. Just as for those moving to the United Kingdom from other parts of the European Union, the rights and entitlements upon which these Britons have made their lives elsewhere are called into question by Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union. Brexit, then, marks the potential for significant transformations to the lives of these migrants that urgently need to be documented.
Given the diversity of this population, the lives that they lead, and their individual needs, the impact of Brexit is unlikely to be uniform. Indeed, it is its diverse impacts and consequences for this population of British citizens that we believe requires urgent attention—for whom among this population is the ability to remain and reside upheld, and for whom is this called into question?

Our findings so far

Although we are in an early stage of data collection, a notable finding from the project is that even though withdrawal has not yet happened, Brexit is having a tangible impact on the lives of Britons living in the EU27. This is notable in the Brexit portraits that our citizens’ panellists have supplied—a selection of these is available at https://brexitbritsabroad.com/conversations/meet/—and in the initial summary findings from our case study research in France—available to download at https://brexitbritsabroad.com/talking-and-writing-about-brexpats/the-british-in-rural-france/.

We are registering high levels of anxiety and uncertainty, particularly among those who might be considered as the more vulnerable within this population. For example, those who are currently in need of continuous medical care are worried about the continuity and cost of this care following Britain’s withdrawal; while those in dual national couples who would, under managed migration systems, be classed as dependent spouses are concerned as to whether they would meet the basic criteria for the right to remain in the countries they call home.

We are also documenting the relative silence in the UK media and in UK negotiating papers, about what Brexit means for the British populations living in the EU27. Where they do appear, familiar tropes—impoverished pensioners, wealthy expatriates—are used and reporting rarely extends beyond consideration of the legal status of these populations. As we stress, such presentations of the British in the EU27 overlook the considerable diversity within this population, and how Brexit might variously impact on their ability to remain in the places that they have come to call home.

Key dates for the project

We anticipate that the next round of summary findings from the project will be available in February 2018. These will include the initial analysis of data collected through interviews with Britons resident in France and Spain. The findings from the expert interviews with institutional actors will also be released at this stage and released as a research report.

However, the nature of the project means that we are releasing findings on an ongoing basis, using a variety of formats. This includes our podcast series and blog. To keep in touch about all the project outputs, you can sign up to our monthly newsletter.

Contact us

If you would like any further information about the project, you can get in touch with the project lead

Dr Michaela Benson
(Goldsmiths, University of London) via Michaela.benson@gold.ac.uk

Other members of the project team include

Professor Karen O’Reilly
Loughborough University
(k.oreilly@lboro.ac.uk)

Dr Katharine Collins
Goldsmiths, University of London
(k.collins@gold.ac.uk)
Project overview

The Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit is a gathering of people from across the UK who have been randomly selected to reflect the make-up of the electorate. They are meeting over two weekends to learn about options for the form Brexit should take (focusing on trade and immigration), discuss what they make of these options, and draw conclusions. Their proposals will be written up in a report and delivered to policy-makers in parliament and government.

The Citizens’ Assembly does not seek to reopen the question of whether the UK should be leaving the EU. Rather, it asks what relationship the UK should have with the EU – in terms of trade and immigration – after Brexit.

The project has three aims:

1. To discover what people think of the Brexit options when they have been able to learn about them and reflect. Polls give some information on public opinion, but often ask questions that respondents have not considered before. The Citizens’ Assembly goes deeper.

2. To help policy-makers. MPs and peers have recognised the importance of public opinion towards Brexit ever since the referendum. The Assembly provides much more information.

3. To illuminate the contribution that deliberative exercises such as this can make to democracy. Public disillusionment with politics is very high, as is concern about the quality of public debate on key policy questions. Citizens’ assemblies offer new ways to engage voters and enable quality, inclusive discussion. The project helps us understand this further.

The Citizens’ Assembly has 51 members from across the UK. They have been chosen in partnership with ICM to reflect the diverse make-up of the UK electorate. They are as representative as possible within a group of this size in terms of six criteria: sex, age, ethnicity, social class, where they live, and how they voted in the Brexit referendum.

The Assembly’s two meeting weekends are carefully structured and facilitated to allow all Assembly members to learn about the issues and options, consider their own priorities, reflect on which options best advance what they want, and draw conclusions. The design of the weekends and facilitation of the discussions is led by Involve, the UK’s leading experts in democratic deliberation.
**Why the project is important**

The project matters for two key reasons:

1. It affords an opportunity to improve policy-making around Brexit. The outcome of the Brexit process must command public legitimacy and survive the test of time in the court of public opinion. The Citizens’ Assembly gives deep insights into informed and considered opinion.

2. It suggests ways to strengthen our democratic practice. Deliberative gatherings such as this could play a variety of roles in policy-making: to improve the quality of public debate, build support for solutions to tricky problems, or foster public acknowledgement of unavoidable trade-offs. The Citizens’ Assembly provides a unique opportunity to find out how effectively they work in the UK in an unusually testing political environment.

**Findings so far**

This project summary was written after the Assembly’s first weekend and before its second weekend. The Assembly’s conclusions are therefore not yet known.

**During the first weekend:**

All 51 people who had been recruited to serve on the Assembly attended. Such high attendance is almost unprecedented for an unofficial body of this kind. It reflects the level of public interest in Brexit as well as the meticulous preparation of the project team.

- The Assembly members heard from eight expert speakers with diverse views on what trade and immigration arrangements the UK should seek after Brexit. The speakers were Angus Armstrong, Catherine Barnard, David Coleman, Anand Menon, David Paton, Jonathan Portes, Thomas Sampson, and Shanker Singham.

- The Assembly members discussed their own priorities and began to consider what they make of the options.

**Key dates**

The Assembly’s meetings took place in Manchester on the weekends of 8 to 10 September and 29th September to 1 October.

The Assembly’s conclusions were published in early October.

A detailed report on the operation of the Assembly is scheduled for publication in late October.

**Contact us**

Project website: [http://citizensassembly.co.uk/brexit/](http://citizensassembly.co.uk/brexit/)

Project leader:

Dr Alan Renwick,
Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit, University College London
a.renwick@ucl.ac.uk

External relations coordinator:

Edward Molloy,
Electoral Reform Society
edward.molloy@electoral-reform.org.uk
Project Overview

What were the public perceptions of Brexit and how have they changed from August 2015 until now?

This collaborative project between the University of Edinburgh’s Neuropolitics Research Lab and Full Fact, the UK’s independent fact-checking organisation is offering new insights into how citizens’ Brexit-related expectations are shaped in an increasingly digital world.

As the Brexit process advances understanding how information on Brexit is perceived by and transmitted to different population groups, and how these processes helps to shape public expectations in relation to Brexit and its consequences are vital.

In this project we have gathered and analysed an extensive Brexit social media dataset which covers data from August 2015 until the present day. We have used data science techniques such as topic modelling, text mining and machine learning to identify who and what was discussed leading up to the Brexit referendum. We are comparing the topics discussed in social media with the topics found in traditional print media to see the differences and similarities between the two datasets. We are investigating what causes the differences in these two sets, does print media set the agenda of what is discussed in social media or do people turn to social media when they feel their views are not accurately represented elsewhere?

This will help to tell us what caught the public imagination in the Brexit debate - was it immigration or was it the economy? Why were certain Brexit facts shared even when they were shown by fact checking organisations to be incorrect? Can we help the public to think more critically about the information that is presented to them? To this end we have developed new behavioural, psychological and neural experiments on fact transmission and public expectations of Brexit. Using advanced experimental techniques such as fMRI brain scanning, eye-tracking and face-emotion coding we are examining: the characteristics that lead to Brexit-related messages being accepted as facts or viewed as misinformation and why they are picked up on and spread online; what leads to such messages being perceived as authoritative or otherwise and what characteristics make for successful and unsuccessful online interventions, to rebut inaccurate or false messages about the Brexit process on social media.

This project is important because:

• It helps people and organisations who want to inform citizens and government on the public expectations of the implementation of Brexit,

• It allows us to gain new insights into what shapes citizens’ expectations on Brexit

• It explains the role played by digital technologies within the Brexit referendum

• It explains how neuroscientific, psychological, behavioural and data science insights can be combined to help understand what makes claims spread on digital platforms

Findings so far:

We have looked at the dynamics of who and what was discussed in social media leading up to the referendum. We have identified a small set of main actors within the debate.
who are often retweeted. For example on the 23rd June 2016, the major influencers within social media were Vote Leave, Leave EU, Stronger In, the Labour Party, Nigel Farage and Louise Mensch. The topics discussed on this day within social media differed from those in the print press. Whilst the print press talked about the economy, British sovereignty, and key actors such as David Cameron, Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, conversations on social media focussed on the NHS, jobs, the mechanics of voting (where to vote, when to vote, whether to bring your own pen), and the historic nature of the referendum.

We have found that information is more likely to be re-tweeted if it is either created by a famous person (with an official blue tick) or has an image attached. The images that are more likely to be re-used are those which are made up of a photograph overlaid with text. Videos and infographics tend not to be re-tweeted. We have an early indication that media was used in different ways depending on the topic discussed. For example the economy is often heavily discussed in social media using text alone, whereas immigration is often only referred to using social media images.

We have been conducting experiments on what makes people endorse unsubstantiated explanations and whether critical analyses of this information can be prompted. We have investigated the effect of source credibility and explanation type on the ratings of explanations. In particular we have looked at whether causal explanations will be rated as better than teleological ones; whether explanations are rated more favourably when attributed to an expert rather than to a suspect source; and whether unsubstantiated explanations are more easily detected when made by a suspect source. We are also looking at the characteristics of the audience/receivers of information. Initial findings suggest that the degree of critical analysis of the information presented is positively correlated with the detection of inappropriate explanations (critical analysis can be used to detect inappropriate and non-credible explanations), and is negatively correlated with explanation ratings (the less critical analysis is used then the explanation will be rated higher for credibility). People that employ critical analysis of presented information tend to not base their judgement as strongly on source credibility. The interaction between explanation type and source credibility is also less pronounced in people more likely to critically analyse information received.

Key dates for the project:

We have sandpits coming up on the 16 November 2017 in London and early December 2017 in Edinburgh to allow the wider public, politicians, journalists, policy-makers, digital platforms and the communications industry to contribute to this ongoing research. Please contact us for more details and if you wish to attend. The project will run until September 2018.

Contact us

Laura Cram
Professor of European Politics and Director of NRLabs
University Of Edinburgh
Laura.Cram@ed.ac.uk
http://www.pol.ed.ac.uk neuropoliticsresearch

Will Moy
Director of Full Fact
Full Fact is the UK’s independent fact checking charity
william.moy@fullfact.org
https://fullfact.org
EU families and ‘eurochildren’ in Brexiting Britain

Project Overview

The UK has been a member of the European Union for 40 years. Throughout this time there has been intermingling of institutions and people, which can be clearly seen in the growing number of bi- and mixed-nationality EU families in the UK and their children, many of whom born in the UK and holding a British passport. In fact, data from recent birth statistics show that almost 12% of children born in England and Wales in 2015 had at least one EU-born parent (the figure rose from 8.1% in 2009). This is a growing, and yet understudied and underreported, segment of the British society. In post-EU referendum Britain the rhetoric about curbing EU immigration has permeated political, media, and popular discourses, producing a stark ‘us and them’ narrative.

Through the study of EU families and their children and their experience and responses to Brexit, this project aims to portray the emergence of a new politics of belonging, which reconfigures discursively and legally who belongs in a post-EU Britain. It aims to establish a baseline for future research on migration and settlement decision-making in families with EU27 nationals, following the formal exit of the European Union. In order to do so, the project team will:

1) Profile and map the population of UK- and EU-born children of EU nationals in the UK and examine, at the aggregate level, different types of EU families and measure their socio-economic inclusion into British society;
2) **Investigate** how families with at least one EU27 member experience and respond to the process of exiting from the European Union and identify factors that shape such responses; and

3) **Examine** the impact of the EU referendum and its aftermath on different age cohorts of UK-born Eurochildren, examining in particular how they articulate their sense of belonging and attitudes vis-à-vis the UK and the EU.

In the first stage of the project, we are building a profile of EU families and their children in the UK and show how it developed over the last three decades. We employ census, live birth and other available data from UK’s national statistics offices to highlight key demographic trends, both geographically and historically.

Drawing on the mapping, the collection of qualitative data via interviews and focus groups will cast light on regional differences and the factors that shape the responses of EU nationals living in the UK.

The analysis of the rapidly evolving political landscape and of the ‘offers’ on the table for EU citizens will enable to develop different legal scenarios that take into account the different family formations and their position in the UK.

While concerns over ‘split allegiances’ are circulating among some political factions, the involvement of ‘second generation’ EU nationals, born in the UK and often holding a British passport, in the study offer a unique vantage point from which to observe the more emotive and personal ramifications of Brexit on British society.

**To find out more about the project:**

Project page:  
https://eurochildren.info/

Podcast, Breaking Brexit  
http://breakingbrexit.com/2017/06/15/episode-1-who-are-the-europeans/

Podcast, Brits Abroad  
https://eurochildren.info/2017/08/25/eu-citizenship-talking-across-borders/

Fact sheet: Citizen’s Rights  
http://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/citizens-rights/  
by Michaela Benson and Nando Sigona

Leave or Remain?  
Diary of an EU citizen in the UK  
https://nandosigona.info/category/eu-referendum-diary-series/

**Forthcoming outputs**

- Briefing Paper: EU families and Brexit: a legal scenario analysis, December 2017
- Briefing Paper: A profile of EU families and their children in the UK, January 2018

**Contact us**

Dr Nando Sigona,  
Principal Investigator,  
n.sigona@bham.ac.uk

Dr Laurence Lessard-Phillips,  
Co-Investigator,  
l.lessard-phillips@bham.ac.uk

Dr Rachel Humphris,  
Senior Researcher,  
r.humphris@bham.ac.uk

The project is carried out in partnership with the3million, Migrant Voice, Migrants’ Rights Network, and barrister Colin Yeo of Garden Court Chambers.
Project Overview

The project will address four main research questions.

First, how do the laws of the four devolved nations, UK and EU currently interact in the field of health?

Secondly, what will the impact be upon domestic health law in the UK when the UK leaves the EU?

Thirdly, how will changes to health policy and practice upon UK withdrawal from the EU be managed and what mechanisms will need to be put in place?

Finally, what will be the impact on broader international law/agreements on health?

These questions will be answered by focusing on four overlapping substantive areas: public health, mobility of patients and health professionals, research, pharmaceuticals and medical devices.

In the initial 9 months of the project we will be holding invitee only Workshops with stakeholders in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland operating under Chatham House rules and also an open event in Brussels. The first Workshops will be held in October in Birmingham and in Brussels followed over the next three months with those in Edinburgh, Belfast and Cardiff. We have attracted considerable interest from a range of diverse stakeholders from patient groups to regulators and professional groups. In stage 2 of the project we will also be undertaking individual interviews with key stakeholders.

Why Is The Project Important?

EU law has had an increasing impacted on the delivery of health care services over the last two decades. This impacts across the UK as a whole with particular specific areas of interest in the devolved jurisdictions in relation to their existing role in this area and what will be devolved post Brexit.

In some areas there are reciprocal rights. One example is patients’ rights such as through the European Health Insurance Card, and what is known as the S1 scheme used by UK citizens who are retirees in another member state. The EHIC card provides some rights to reciprocal health care, but with some differences in its application across member states. We are considering the implications of the withdrawal of such rights for patients in the future. Other EU rights in relation to cross- border treatment including those where patients have sought treatment using the provisions of the EU Patients’ Rights Directive as to the application of EU law and
European Court of Justice rulings in this area post Brexit. Northern Ireland poses particular challenges in relation to reciprocal health care post Brexit which we are also exploring in this project. There are long-standing cross-border healthcare arrangements with patients crossing the border to receive services and the status of such provision may be impacted by any return to a hard border.

The EU plays an important role in pharmaceutical regulation. The project is exploring the broader implications for pharmaceutical regulation and safety in the immediate period of Brexit, such as notification of suspected serious adverse reactions but also the longer term impact. Here notable issues include not only the implications for Clinical Trials in the light of the new EU Clinical Trials Directive due to come into force after we leave the EU, but what happens to our role in developing and adhering to international standards of good clinical practice when we have third country status. A further related question is that of the regulation of EU medical devices, an area also due to be impacted by further new EU regulations due to come into force post Brexit.

In the area of public health the EU has been an important driver in relation to questions such as tobacco control and also communicable disease control. Similarly, the EU currently regulates the quality and safety of blood (a matter of current controversy in the light of compensation for those who have suffered in the past as a result of transfusions of contaminated blood), tissues and organs. Withdrawal from the EU will have related implications for bodies such as NHS Blood and Transplant and the Human Tissue Authority and we are exploring the implications of this.

Key dates for the project


Stakeholder Interviews: March- May 2018.

Project Conference: Provisional Date mid June 2018.

Project publications include a special edition of the Law Journal Medical International due in January 2018, publications in other law and medical journals and policy briefings.

Contact us

Principal Investigator
Professor Jean McHale, Director of the Centre for Health Law Science and Policy, University of Birmingham,
j.v.mchale@bham.ac.uk

Co- investigators
Professor Tammy Hervey, Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law, University of Sheffield.
t.hervey@sheffield.ac.uk

Dr Mark Flear, Senior Lecturer in Law, Queens University Belfast.
m.flear@qub.ac.uk

WEBSITE: www.healthybrexit.org
TWITTER - @healthyBrexit
**Project overview**

This project monitors the negotiations as they develop on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Focusing on the positions of the various EU institutions and key member states involved, it brings together leading specialists from across Europe to form an observatory that will provide running analysis and insight. ‘Negotiating Brexit’ will track and explain the changing political context and positions taken by the UK’s negotiating partners, use this understanding to explore the negotiating possibilities available to the UK, and examine the implications of the outcome for the UK, the future of the EU, and the UK’s relationship with the EU.

For each member state and institution, it will:

- **consider** how the UK’s negotiating stance is perceived and understood
- **look** at how approaches have developed since the referendum and how they stand at key points
- **explain** who is in charge, how the negotiating position was defined, the main trade-offs made, and responses to relevant pressures
- **provide** commentary through a project website, briefings, and blogs as the negotiations develop

Correspondents will use official documents, speeches, and interviews with politicians, officials, and stakeholders to inform their analyses. The members of the research team have been selected on account of their specialist knowledge and experience. They will report on the European Council, European Commission, and European Parliament, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Austria, Sweden, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania, as well as Norway (the largest member of EFTA) and the UK.
Why the project is important

The current negotiations and their outcome will have far-reaching consequences for the UK and the EU, as well as for other international bodies, governments, and populations. For the UK, the effects will be felt across all sectors of the economy, as well as on trade, domestic politics, foreign policy, and relations between the home nations. For the remaining EU member states, as well as potentially for the European Economic Association (EEA) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the impact will be economic and geopolitical.

Since the terms of any agreement will depend on the stances of the UK’s negotiating partners as well as the UK, it will be important to understand their approaches to the UK, the lines that they take, and the factors that are shaping their positions. How they respond to the domestic debate in the UK, as well as to the pronouncements of government, and UK diplomacy in Brussels and more broadly, is also likely to be significant. ‘Negotiating Brexit’ will provide informed analysis of the thinking in key European countries, as well as in the main EU institutions.

Correspondents will report on the positions of leaders and governments, key political parties, and media and public opinion at key stages of the negotiations, as well as following important domestic milestones, such as general elections. They will report on the likelihood that governments and institutions are prepared to countenance trade-offs, on potential fault lines among the remaining EU member states, and on the likely terms of the outcome.

Key dates for the project

Funding has been awarded for an eighteen-month period from 1 May 2017 to 31 October 2018.

‘Negotiating Brexit’ will publish regular briefings, blogs, and newspaper articles on governments and institutions throughout the duration of the project. A conference on 20 October 2017 will see the launch of a guide to the positions of the UK’s negotiating partners. The guide, podcasts and reports will be available for downloading and viewing on the project website.

A second conference in autumn 2018 will review the progress of negotiations and assess the likely outcome. The team will produce a further accompanying guide. Members of the research team will be available throughout the project to deliver talks and give briefings.

Two collective volumes are planned following the conclusion of negotiations. The first is a book that will explain the positions taken by governments and institutions over the two-year period of the negotiations. The second is a reflection on the domestic politics of Brexit in key EU member countries, as well as Norway.

Contact us

Hussein Kassim,
*h.kassim@uea.ac.uk*,

Simon Usherwood,
*s.usherwood@surrey.ac.uk*,

Vanessa Buth,
*nbo.ppl@uea.ac.uk*,
The key objectives of the project are:

1. To enhance understanding of how the vote for Brexit has affected UK party politics, including divisions within and between parties, the positions and preferences of MPs, party positions in Parliament and party competition on EU issues.

2. To develop knowledge of how Parliament has responded to Brexit in terms of its structures and procedures, and how effective this response has been.

3. To identify those areas of policy that have been most subject to conflict between and within parties and are most likely to change once the UK has left the EU and competences have been repatriated.

In relation to the exercise of competences post-Brexit, initial research findings suggest that the European Union (Withdrawal Bill) may not necessarily offer the fully functioning statute book which the Bill is intended to deliver. In particular, the specific question of administrative and judicial enforcement of former EU laws, and the protection of individual rights and legitimate expectations once competences are repatriated, remain outstanding. Initial research indicates that without the establishment of corresponding oversight mechanisms, which are similar to those that make up the EU’s enforcement regime, UK citizens will be in a weaker position in relation to the exercise of legislative and administrative powers of the State.

Research thus far has identified that individuals will find protection of their rights more difficult post-Brexit without a replacement for the effective system of administrative oversight and EU judicial remedies that currently exist against a Member State which is in breach of its EU law obligations. In practice this will mean that, for example, the established principle of State liability is no longer available in the UK courts as a mechanism for holding the State to account when it has infringed individual rights. The Withdrawal Bill is silent on these specific legal issues and, over the coming months, the passage of the Bill will be closely followed to identify how MPs begin to address this accountability gap, and how MPs consider that citizen’s rights enshrined in the laws repatriated through the Withdrawal Bill will be effectively protected through administrative and judicial processes.
Research conducts and outputs produced

We have so far conducted eight interviews with Parliamentary clerks at Westminster. These feed in to our second research question on how Parliament has dealt with Brexit. With regard to our first research question, we have collected data on Labour MPs who rebelled on the bill allowing the government to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (including their reasons for rebellion and their position in the referendum of 2016). These have been used alongside data on Conservative MPs (e.g. the frequency with which they rebelled on EU issues and how they voted in the referendum, as well as data on how constituencies voted) and their public statements on their referendum position. This has allowed us to assess (a) the extent of division within the major political parties on Brexit, (b) the factors explaining MPs’ likelihood to vote ‘Leave’, (c) the extent to which public views were represented in MPs’ voting behaviour in the referendum, (d) the incentives and tensions facing MPs on Brexit issues in Parliament. These analyses have fed into a series of outputs set out below.

We have submitted one article to a peer-reviewed journal:


We have made three conference presentations as follows:


We have published the following blog posts:


We have contributed to the following Research Papers:

• Adam Cygan, ‘The Role of Parliament’ in EU Referendum: One Year On, 23 June 2017 http://ukandeu.ac.uk/research-papers/eu-referendum-one-year-on/


Further blog posts on Brexit and party change will follow soon

Our project website is shortly to be launched. It will feature blog posts from the research team as well as providing a platform for making our data publicly available.

The first meeting of our Advisory Board will take place on Wednesday 27 September at the University of Leicester.

In addition to this we are holding an event in Leicester on Monday 6 November as part of the ESRC’s Festival of Social Science. Our event is entitled “What would a good Brexit look like for Leicester and Leicestershire?” and will bring together representatives from politics, business and academia as well as the public.
This project is monitoring and analysing public attitudes towards Brexit as the negotiations between the UK and the European Union proceed. It is addressing three main questions:

1. What relationship, if any, would voters in Britain like with the European Union?
2. What are voters’ expectations of what Brexit will achieve, and how well do they think the negotiations are being handled?
3. What impact, if any, is Brexit having on the pattern of electoral support for Britain’s political parties and on public attitudes in Scotland towards the country’s constitutional status?

The decision to leave the European Union is the product of an instruction from the electorate. Policy makers are now endeavouring to implement that instruction. However, on its own the outcome of the referendum offers little guidance as to what kind of relationship voters would like Britain to have with the European Union in future. This project aims to provide guidance as to where voters’ preferences lie on the very many issues that now have to be settled in the wake of Brexit.

Meanwhile, the referendum itself was politically divisive and disruptive. MPs and supporters of the same party found themselves on opposite sides of the debate. Some on the ‘left’ politically voted to Leave, others voted to Remain. Those on the ‘right’ were equally divided. Scotland voted to Remain, England and Wales to Leave. If, as seems inevitable, Brexit continues to be the most prominent issue in British public debate, it would appear to have the potential to disrupt traditional voting patterns and to affect attitudes in Scotland towards the country’s constitutional status. Either development would have potentially important consequences for Britain’s domestic politics.

Much of the work of the project is a continuation of previous work on public attitudes towards the EU that began before the EU referendum and has continued thereafter. It is being pursued by (a) every few months asking a panel of survey respondents what kind of Brexit they would prefer and what they think of the negotiations so far, (b) including questions on the annual British and Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, and (c) maintaining previously established websites, whatukthinks.org/eu and whatscotlandthinks.org, that provide a comprehensive collection of polling data on (i) attitudes towards the EU, and (ii) how Scotland should be governed, together with regular commentary and analyses.

The project’s approach to ascertaining the public’s attitudes towards Brexit has three distinctive features. First, it does not presume...
that voters understand terms, such as ‘single market’, ‘freedom of movement’ or ‘customs union’. Everyday language is used in all survey questions. Second, it does not assume that voters’ attitudes are structured in accordance with the trade-offs, such as between immigration control and access to the single market, that policymakers widely assume the UK faces in the negotiations. Third, it has a particular interest in those aspects of Britain’s current relationship with the EU that have a direct bearing on individual citizens, such as access to the European Health Card and the quality of sea water for bathing, which have received little, if any, attention elsewhere.

To date, the attitudes towards the Brexit negotiations of people across Britain as a whole have been ascertained on three occasions, in September 2016, February 2017 and July 2017. Further waves of interviewing will be conducted this autumn and next spring. A separate set of respondents in Scotland was also interviewed in February and will be contacted again this autumn. In both cases the interviews are being conducted either online or via the telephone with people who were first interviewed for the British or Scottish Social Attitudes survey, the respondents to which are selected entirely at random. A report on the Initial findings from each wave of the research is routinely posted at [http://whatukthinks.org/eu/comment-analysis/analysis/](http://whatukthinks.org/eu/comment-analysis/analysis/) and presentations given in the Palace of Westminster and the Scottish Parliament.

**Amongst the key findings of this research to date are:**

1. A majority of voters (including at least half of Remain voters) would appear to want to end freedom of movement but, at the same time, are willing to maintain free trade. Voters do not necessarily recognise the trade-offs that the UK is thought to face in the negotiations.

2. There is relatively strong support for maintaining much of the consumer and environmental protection currently afforded by the EU, though rather less do for EU’s regulation of the labour market.

3. Attitudes towards Brexit in Scotland are not markedly different from those in the rest of the UK, though voters are divided on whether the country should have to leave the EU as a result of the outcome of the UK referendum.

Modules of questions designed to ascertain some of the longer-term implications of the Brexit decision for, inter alia, who votes for which party and attitudes towards how Scotland should be governed, are currently being fielded as part of the 2017 British and Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, the initial results for which will be published in spring/summer 2018. An analysis of how people voted in the EU referendum based on data collected as part of the 2016 British survey is available at [http://www-bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-34/brexit.aspx](http://www-bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-34/brexit.aspx). Meanwhile, blogs and analyses based on a variety of data sources are routinely being posted on the ‘WhatUKThinks’ and ‘WhatScotlandThinks’ websites.

**Contact us**

Principal Investigator  
Prof. John Curtice  
[J.Curtice@strath.ac.uk](mailto:J.Curtice@strath.ac.uk)

Researcher  
Ian Montagu  
[ian.Montagu@scotcen.org.uk](mailto:ian.Montagu@scotcen.org.uk)

The ‘Brexit referendum’ and identity politics in Britain

Project overview

The referendum vote to leave the EU revealed deep social divides which cut across traditional party lines, and set up the most complex and divisive political reform agenda for decades. The manner in which the government proceeds with this agenda will depend very much on the patterns of electoral competition it faces. All governments are sensitive to electoral pressure, and the current government, with a perilously small and insecure support from the DUP, will be no exception. The electoral pressures on the government will be, in turn, to a large extent influenced by how the politics of immigration develop post-referendum, and how much immigration policy will change in the process of leaving the EU. This programme of high impact research will offer new insights on some of the most important new pressures on UK politics in the aftermath of the vote for Brexit.

Why the project is important

The existing work around Brexit is relatively short sighted both in terms of identifying the underlying causes of the decision to leave, but more importantly in terms of identifying what will be the long term consequences not just of the referendum result itself, but also of those underlying causes. We will show that many of the social divisions that have precipitated the referendum will impact long term policies ranging from immigrant integration to welfare state.

Your findings so far

We found that beyond the well known causes of Brexit, the rarely included attitude towards the broad diversity agenda (women, gay and ethnic minority rights) was a strong predictor of Leave vote, even controlling for such well known factors as anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-elite sentiments. Crucially, a perception that ethnic minorities’ rights have gone too far is a highly partisan attitude, which gives it a potent electoral impact, and it is on the rise among the British population.

Rob Ford and Maria Sobolewska are about to publish a chapter in a new book titled Governing England, edited by Profs Mike Kenny, Ian Mclean and Akash Paun, where they show that the attitudes towards ethnic minority rights are correlated with English national identity, making them a long lasting and potentially important influence in politics. Any policy proposals that can be viewed through the lens of diversity agenda are likely therefore to be divisive. Unsurprisingly therefore the diversity agenda is already at the forefront of the efforts by the new UKIP leadership to reinvent the party post Referendum.

The other important strand of the Project is the analysis of the 2017 elections. We have written a short summary of our initial analysis in Brexit: One Year On report with UK in the Changing Europe and Profs Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath penned a report UK 2017 General Election vote examined: income, poverty and Brexit for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation on lower income voters in the election. Some of the findings of this report are that while the Conservatives appealed to many lower income voters’ support for Brexit and immigration control, Labour also successfully appealed to many of these voters’ economic concerns over
living standards, redistribution, inequality and austerity. In the end, many voters who are struggling to get by, are concerned about immigration and may have voted for Brexit were more likely to vote for Labour because of their desire for economic redistribution and to endorse Labour’s anti-austerity platform. As a result, Labour’s pitch to these voters was a key driver of its performance at the 2017 election, but no political party made a major and clear breakthrough with these groups. These groups are therefore open to mobilization from any political party, but also in danger to return to their voter apathy that has been typical of them before the Referendum.

**Contact us**

This project is led by Dr Maria Sobolewska, University of Manchester, who specialises in ethnic minorities’ electoral behaviour, political representation of minorities, perceptions of race and ethnicity and immigrant integration.

*maria.sobolewska@manchester.ac.uk, @smthgsmtgh*

Professor Robert Ford, University of Manchester, who specialises in politics of immigration, welfare state and the rise of the radical right.

*rob.ford@manchester.ac.uk, @robfordmancs*

Professor Matthew Goodwin, University of Kent, who specialises in the rise of the radical right.

*m.j.goodwin@kent.ac.uk, @GoodwinMJ, www.matthewjgoodwin.org*
Project overview

Brexit now appears likely to lead to significant changes in to the UK’s trading relationships with the rest of the world. The UK is set to negotiate a new trading relationship with the EU, and, if it leaves the Customs Union, may also seek to establish new trade deals with third countries over the coming years. These developments could have profound consequences for the UK labour market. But which workers are likely to be affected and what is the best way for policymakers to respond to help workers who might be dislocated by these changes? This project aims to answer these questions by: 1) examining how past trade “shocks” have impacted the economic geography of the UK and affected the labour market outcomes of different workers and areas, and 2) mapping the exposure of different regions and workers to possible future changes in trade policy. The results from both of these analyses will help enhance our understanding of how different areas and types of workers might be affected by the trade effects of Brexit, and any subsequent trade deals. The project will examine these issues in the following ways:

1. We will use detailed data on international trade flows and domestic business turnover to document how import penetration has changed across industries over the last two decades and discuss how this relates to changes in the industrial composition of regional employment.

2. We will identify the causal impact of past trade shocks on the earnings and employment of different UK workers.

The trade shocks we intend to examine are the surge in Chinese imports that occurred around 2001 following China’s accession to the WTO and the effects of EU enlargement in 2004. Both of these developments led to rapid increases in imports which were concentrated in particular industries. We will examine how the impacts of sudden increases in imports on worker and local area outcomes vary according to local area industrial composition, as well as the persistence of any effects on different
workers, and the different ways workers and firms adjust to shocks. In addition, we will consider both the direct effects of imports on UK workers employed in competing industries and indirect effects from industries enjoying cheaper inputs or seeing reduced demand for the output from industries they supply to.

3. We will consider the exposure of different regions and worker-types to a situation where the EU imposed WTO “Most-favoured Nation” tariffs on exports from UK industries, and discuss this in relation to the findings from (2).

4. We will examine the extent to which existing regionally-targeted funding (including European funding) targets areas that have been (or could be) affected by future trade shocks.

Why the project is important

The findings from our work will provide a comprehensive picture of how sudden changes in trade have affected labour market outcomes and how these impacts propagated through the economy through input-output linkages between industries. The precise way in which workers are affected by trade shocks is not only of interest in itself but also has important implications for the effectiveness of different policy responses to help UK workers adjust to changes in trade policy.

By documenting how different labour market outcomes were affected by past trade shocks, and how workers responded to these impacts, the project will also be able to draw conclusions on the most appropriate policies to support those affected by reconfigurations in the UK’s trading relationships. For instance, if shocks lead to relatively short-periods of unemployment followed by persistently low earnings, then measures aimed at helping the low paid may be of more use than changes in unemployment benefits. Regionally-based assistance would be supported if the effects of trade shocks are concentrated in particular regions, whereas general interpersonal redistribution may be more appropriate if affected workers migrate elsewhere.

Our results should be of direct interest to policy makers as they negotiate the UK’s future trading relationships and prepare for the UK’s exit from the EU.

Key dates for the project

Preliminary results on import penetration and regional employment trends should be available in late 2017, with findings of the impact of trade shocks and policy recommendations in 2018.

Contact us

IFS, www.ifs.org.uk;
Peter Levell, project leader, IFS, peter_l@ifs.org.uk
Agnes Norris Keiller, researcher, IFS, agnes_nk@ifs.org.uk
David Phillips, researcher, IFS, david_p@ifs.org.uk
Matthias Parey, researcher, IFS and University of Essex, m.parey@essex.ac.uk
Brexit is the most important change in UK economic policy for a generation, but there is considerable uncertainty over what the economic impact of Brexit will be and how different consumers and sectors will be affected. Using data on key economic indicators (stock market prices, consumer prices, trade), this project aims at analysing the short-run consequences of the vote to leave the EU on the UK’s economic performance.

The findings will expand the evidence base available to citizens seeking to understand Brexit and policy makers responsible for implementing Brexit. In particular, our results will help identify priorities for the UK in upcoming negotiations with the EU and other non-EU countries.

The project has three components:

1. We analyse how the Brexit vote affected the stock market value of UK firms. This event study will shed light on market participants’ expectations of Brexit’s economic impact.

2. We study the effect of the Brexit vote on consumer price index (CPI) inflation in the UK. This will provide evidence on the short-run economic impact of the referendum.

3. We estimate the impact of the decision to leave the EU on the UK’s exports and imports in order to understand whether the referendum has affected UK trade before Brexit occurs.

Stock market prices

We will analyse the determinants of stock price movements on the first trading day after the referendum (24 June 2016) as well as two other important dates – Theresa May’s Conservative party conference speech (5 October 2016) and her Lancaster House Speech (17 January 2017), both of which have been interpreted as signalling the intention to pursue a ‘hard Brexit’. We will look at how firm-level changes in stock prices on these days are correlated with likely changes in tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade after the UK leaves the EU and with firms’ exposure to European and global markets. Our results will show whether the market values of firms and sectors that rely more heavily on trade with the EU are more sensitive to news about Brexit.

CPI inflation

Following the Brexit referendum sterling depreciated sharply and this has been followed by an increase in CPI inflation from 0.5 percent in June 2016 to 2.6 percent in June 2017. Many commentators have blamed Brexit for the increase in inflation, but other factors, such as changes in oil prices, also affect inflation dynamics. To what extent is the Brexit vote responsible for the rise in inflation and what does this tell us about how Brexit has affected real wage growth? To answer these questions, we will exploit heterogeneity across product groups in exposure to increased import costs to isolate the effect of Brexit on changes in inflation.

UK trade

We will study whether the referendum has impacted UK’s pattern of trade in the short-run. Although trade barriers between the UK and the EU will not change until the UK leaves the EU, the referendum outcome had
two immediate consequences: it changed expectations about the future path of tariffs and non-tariff barriers faced by UK exporters and importers, and it led sterling to depreciate causing a deterioration of the UK’s terms of trade. We will analyse how these changes affect the UK’s imports and exports and whether the response differs across products and destinations.

**Key dates**

The project is making rapid progress and we anticipate publishing initial results for the stock market and inflation studies by the end of 2017. As trade data takes longer to become available than stock market or inflation data, the trade component of the project will start in late 2017 and results should be available by the middle of 2018.

**Contact us**

Thomas Sampson, Research Leader, London School of Economics,  
t.a.sampson@lse.ac.uk

Holger Breinlich, Co-investigator, University of Nottingham,  
holger.breinlich@nottingham.ac.uk

Dennis Novy, Co-investigator, University of Warwick,  
d.novy@warwick.ac.uk
The Microeconomic Consequences of Brexit: Local economic effects

Motivation

The expected macroeconomic impact of Brexit was widely discussed both prior to, and following, the referendum of June 2016. However, there is limited understanding of how the Brexit vote has, and will continue to, affect the country on a more regional level, as well as what might happen to individual firms and workers in different parts of the country. Given the regional disparity that exists in terms of employment and wages in the UK currently, it is vital to understand how trade agreements may alleviate or exacerbate the existing divisions.

Areas in the UK differ substantially in the types of industries that dominate the local economy. For example, finance is a leading sector in London while manufacturing is relatively small: conversely in the North East of England, the manufacturing sector dominates, while finance contributes little to the local economy. Consequently, based on the extent of their commitments across industries, future trade deals will have different effects across regions. The aim of the project is to provide robust evidence as to which trade policies can best account for the needs of different regions and different sectors of the UK economy.

Methodology

Our research will study the effects of Brexit and future trade agreements on a number of economic outcomes – trade, wages, prices and productivity. Using the most detailed data available, we will examine how the Brexit vote has actually affected different parts of the UK, and what might happen to individual firms and workers in different regions within the country as a result of future policies to engage with the EU and the rest of the world.

Our research will draw on microeconomic data to determine the impacts of various trade agreements on the living standards of individuals in different regions. We will assess the consequences of Brexit for local economies in both the short and long term. The main objectives of the proposed research are:

1. To create a granular breakdown of local economies, by sector and exposure to international markets, to determine how Brexit would affect economic activity and employment across regions.
2. To study the actual impact on local economies resulting from changes following the Brexit vote.

Preliminary Findings

As a starting point, we predict the local economic impacts under two different scenarios, soft and hard Brexit, which are developed from a structural trade model (Dhingra et al. 2016). Taking the sectoral changes in economic activity from the trade model, we use regional employment shares in each industry to predict the local economic effects of soft and hard Brexit scenarios. Average effects are negative under both scenarios, and more negative under hard Brexit. The spatial variation in negative shocks across areas is higher under in the latter case as some local areas are particularly specialised in sectors that are predicted to be badly hit by hard Brexit. Areas in the South of England, and urban areas, are harder hit by Brexit under both scenarios. Again, this pattern is explained by sector specialisation. Table 1 provides a list of the top ten most and least affected Local Authorities under the hard Brexit scenario. It is also important to note that the places experiencing the biggest initial shock are not necessarily those that will experience the most negative effects once the economy has adjusted. However, Figure 2 shows the areas that were most likely to vote remain are those that are predicted to be most negatively impacted by Brexit.
Future Work

These figures are far from the last word, but they do provide an initial indication of the way in which the impact of Brexit may be felt differently across the areas of Great Britain. Our ongoing work will use finer data to refine the analysis and to understand the impacts working through channels other than trade, such as migration and investment, and to understand the longer run impacts as the economy adjusts.

Table 1: Most and Least Affected Local Authorities (% Change in Gross Value Added)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soft Brexit (%)</th>
<th>Hard Brexit (%)</th>
<th>Bottom 10</th>
<th>Soft Brexit (%)</th>
<th>Hard Brexit (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bottom 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of London</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>Eden</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen City</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>Moray</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>North Lincolnshire</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watford</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>Corby</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mole Valley</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>Anglesey</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Hertfordshire</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>South Holland</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>Crawley</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reigate and Banstead</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>Isles of Scilly</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worthing</td>
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<td>-2.8</td>
<td>Melton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islington</td>
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<td>-2.8</td>
<td>Hounslow</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Brexit GVA Impact and Referendum Vote Share

(a): Soft Brexit

(b): Hard Brexit

Contact us

Principal Investigator:
Dr Swati Dhingra
Lecturer in Economics,
London School of Economics (LSE)
s.dhingra@lse.ac.uk

Co-Investigator:
Professor Steve Machin,
Professor of economics,
London school of economics (LSE)
s.j.machin@lse.ac.uk
Project overview

This project examines the effects of Brexit on devolution and multi-level government. The study explores the impact of repatriation on the devolution settlements and inter-institutional relations, whether UK common frameworks are necessary to replace EU frameworks, and how these might be developed. It examines the implications of alternative political, legal and financial models under consideration, and evaluates legislative and intergovernmental processes as they unfold. As well as looking at the big picture effects that the Brexit process has on devolution, the project takes a closer look at three policy fields: agriculture; environment/renewable energy; and justice and home affairs. These fields are simultaneously devolved and Europeanized, complex and politically salient.

Why the project is important

The devolution settlement in the United Kingdom has been embedded in UK membership of the European Union. In policy areas where the devolved institutions share competence with the EU, like agriculture, the environment, fisheries, regional development and justice and home affairs, the EU has provided a common policy framework. European regulations are applicable uniformly across the UK, and European law is embedded in the devolution statutes. Whichever relationship is negotiated between the UK Government and the EU, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will affect the powers of the devolved nations in complex ways. It could lead to further decentralization of power to the devolved institutions, or alternatively, to powers being recentralized within UK-wide institutions. A third possibility is the setting up of new forums and processes to enable the UK and devolved governments to cooperate more closely on policy areas where their powers overlap. Devolving repatriated powers could create market distortions and externalities which may be problematic unless effective processes for policy coordination can be put in place.

Findings so far

The repatriation of competences following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU necessarily affects the competences and capacities of the devolved legislatures and governments. The team has been studying the complexities of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, associated statements from the UK and devolved governments, and parliamentary debates and inquiries.

The Withdrawal Bill repatriates EU competences to the Westminster parliament, at least in the first instance, by imposing a new constraint on devolved institutions to comply with ‘retained EU law’. This marks a change to the devolution settlements with a new and at present unclear restriction on competence. In practice, the Bill’s impact on devolution will depend upon the definition, scope and longevity of this new category of ‘retained EU law’, which remains ambiguous and subject to the possibility of amendment as the Bill progresses through Parliament. There is provision within the Bill to create exceptions to the ‘retained EU law constraint’ by order in council, following a process of intergovernmental negotiation. However, in the absence of such an agreement, the Bill creates a new default position which would have the effect of increasing the policy fields which are reserved to Westminster. In addition, there...
remains doubt about the extent to which the delegated powers in the Bill, accorded to UK Ministers to ‘prevent, remedy or mitigate’ deficiencies in retained EU law, will be used to alter devolved competence or to constrain the devolved authorities’ scope for policy-making. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, we conclude that, in its current form, the bill could presage the first significant recentralization of power within the UK since devolution.

The team has been examining the constitutional and political issues around legislative consent on the part of the devolved legislatures, and the prospects of such consent being withheld. We are also exploring the meaning and implications of the concept of a ‘UK single market’ and the UK common frameworks which may be introduced to avoid trading barriers, competition and disruptive policy divergences after Brexit. Drawing on comparative evidence, we have presented the variety of models that such common frameworks could take, including negotiated concordats, concurrent competence, framework legislation, and conditional funding, as well as the general reservation of retained EU law as proposed in the current bill.

Key dates for the project

The project runs until the end of September 2018. The team is issuing briefing papers and blogs throughout the project, and is available to provide evidence to parliamentary committees. We will be holding a workshop on Brexit, devolution and agriculture in Cardiff in December 2017, and two further workshops on justice & home affairs and on climate and energy in the spring of 2018. Each of these will be followed by dissemination of policy-focused briefing papers. A final workshop in summer 2018 will reflect upon the impact of Brexit on the dynamics of devolution across the UK. If you would like to attend any of these workshops, please use the contact details below.

Contact us

Professor Nicola McEwen,
University of Edinburgh, Associate Director, Centre on Constitutional Change, Research Leader, UK in a Changing Europe.
n.mcewen@ed.ac.uk,

Professor Stephen Tierney,
Director of the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law, University of Edinburgh, Research Fellow, Centre on Constitutional Change.
s.tierney@ed.ac.uk,

Professor Michael Keating,
Universities of Aberdeen and Edinburgh, Director, Centre on Constitutional Change.
m.keating@abdn.ac.uk,

Further information: http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/
What do people in Northern Ireland think about Brexit? And crucially, what do they think about the border with the Republic and how it might be affected by the Brexit negotiations? Would a ‘hardening’ of the border lead to serious discontent among Northern Ireland citizens? Would it be likely to have a negative affect on the peace process, and on political stability?

Northern Ireland doesn’t have a government. Thus, it is particularly important to know what ordinary people think about these important issues. Our project seeks to provide policy makers with useful evidence on citizens’ views, based in part on conventional survey data but mainly on an ambitious set of deliberative democracy exercises.

We thus use two types of data. First, we explore data from a large-scale representative survey of over 1000 citizens that we conducted in spring 2017. This survey was a follow-up study of people who were interviewed at the time of the referendum in 2016. Hence, these data allow an insight into the extent to which people may have changed their minds on Brexit since the referendum, and on their views of the border and other Brexit issues. Some preliminary findings are presented opposite under three headings.

- Voting was strongly driven by Northern Ireland’s religious and political divide
- Voters who are Irish, Catholic, nationalist, or pro-united Ireland were over twice as likely to vote Remain than voters who were Protestant, unionist, British, or pro-Direct Rule
- Voting intention in event of a second referendum

- 90% of Remain voters in 2016 would continue to vote Remain in a second referendum
- Under three quarters of Leave voters would continue to vote Leave in a second referendum
- Switchers from Leave to Remain over twice as large, 17%, as Remain-to-Leave switchers: 7%
- So? Overall, significant slippage in the Leave vote
- 29% of all respondents in 2017 thought the economy in Northern Ireland would be better after Brexit, but there are massive differences between pro-Remain respondents (only 7% are positive) and pro-Leave respondents (76% are positive)
- Two thirds believe that Northern Ireland should have ‘special status’, but massive differences exist: 85% of pro-Remain and only 32% of pro-Leave agree with special status
- But people are agreed on one thing: Very few want a hard border with the Republic (16%) and this is true of both sides: only 11% of pro-Remain and only 24% of pro-Leave
As well as this large volume of survey data, our main evidence is based on two “deliberative democracy” exercises scheduled for February 2018, with results made available by the end of March. In these exercises a cross-section of 50 Northern Ireland citizens, representative of the different communities and viewpoints, are brought together and are given the space, time and relevant information to really consider, reflect upon and discuss the challenging issue of Brexit and the border. Once citizens have considered the issues, we ask them to put forward their own views. The results will paint a detailed picture of what people from all backgrounds in Northern Ireland think about the Brexit negotiation process, especially as it relates to the issue of the border.

**Contact us**

Please visit our website for details of the full team and our analysis and writings on this topic so far: [https://www.qub.ac.uk/sites/brexitni/](https://www.qub.ac.uk/sites/brexitni/)

This report was written by the project lead Professor John Garry

**j.garry@qub.ac.uk**

Professor John Coakley

**j.coakley@qub.ac.uk**

**Key dates:**

How will Brexit affect the development and growth of British manufacturing firms? Britain’s popular referendum vote to exit from the European Union has created a great deal of uncertainty about the future of Britain’s external trade relations with countries that belong to the European Union as well as with other major trading economies external to the EU, including the United States and China. Two major and interrelated sources of uncertainty are (a) the future value of the pound sterling relative to the currencies of Britain’s trading partners and (b) the future trade policy on imports into the UK as well as the future trade policy Britain’s exports will face in the EU.

In this research project, we are conducting:

1. legal research on Britain’s rights and obligations under the WTO and numerous bilateral investment treaties in order to focus the economic analysis of policy options (import tariffs, production subsidies) to those that the British government can legally use under international law;

2. economic research focused on trade policies, trade flows and trade impacts in order to predict the impact of Brexit and any proposed future trade agreements on British manufacturers that use imported inputs in their production, British firms that compete with imports in the UK market, on British exporters to EU and non-EU destinations and on workers and consumers in the UK; and

3. economic research on exchange rate pass through (ERPT) in order to forecast how changes in the value of the pound sterling will pass through into British import and export prices.

This project is conducting empirical analyses using firm-level customs and VAT data from HMRC, labour market data from ONS, firm-level customs data from China and trade policy data from the World Bank and WTO.

Why is this project important?

The imminent de-coupling of Britain’s external trade policy from that of the EU raises a host of questions about the appropriate conduct of trade policy to serve the needs of manufacturers located in the UK and the UK population. Key to making a sound policy choice will be an understanding of the consequences of not only any tariff imposed by Britain, but also how new and existing EU import tariffs will impact Britain’s trade and domestic import-competing manufacturers who have been battered by intense global competition.
To date, one of the most apparent effects of Brexit has been the devaluation of the pound sterling which brings the looming threat of price increases on consumer goods and firm inputs. In order to conduct effective fiscal and monetary policy, policymakers will require forecasts of the evolution of UK prices in a highly uncertain environment and a clear understanding of which features of the economic environment – domestic market structure, competition from exports, the size distribution of firms in an industry, the share of distribution services in the price of a final good, etc. – impact price changes.

Development of disaggregated models of exchange rate pass through as well as tariff impacts on pricing and trade flows will allow us to answer practical and pertinent questions such as: How much will the price of Britain’s imports rise as a consequence of the pound’s devaluation? How will the volume of its exports change when the relative price of its imported inputs increases and the relative price of its exports fall on world markets? Which industrial sectors will benefit the most from the competitive advantage in foreign markets arising from the pound’s devaluation? How will a new EU or US import tariff on Chinese steel affect British steel manufacturers? Our models will provide quantitative answers to such questions which are important in the context of the UK-EU negotiations as well as preparatory talks with potential free-trade partners.

**Key dates**

- September 2018 Policy Workshop on Trade Agreements and Trade Policy
- Spring 2019 Academic Conference on Trade Policy and Exchange Rates (tentative)
- September 2019 Policy Workshop on Exchange Rates and Brexit (tentative)

**Research Findings**

Analysis is in-progress. We anticipate producing one working paper on trade policy and one on exchange rates by December 2017.

**Contact us**

Project Website: [www.econ.cam.ac.uk/brexit](http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/brexit)

Investigators:

Dr. Meredith A Crowley, Principal Investigator
Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
meredith.crowley@econ.cam.ac.uk

Professor Giancarlo Corsetti, Co-investigator
Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
gc422@cam.ac.uk

Dr. Lorand Bartels
Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
lab53@cam.ac.uk
This project will examine the impact of Brexit on UK fisheries policy. Leaving the EU will mean that the UK will leave the structures of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Nevertheless, as fish do not stay within national boundaries, and as there are obligations in international law to co-operate in the management of fisheries, the UK will still have to work with the rest of the EU and other territories. This means the UK will take on a third-party status relative to the EU. This project will examine how these non-EU states (Norway and Iceland) and territories (the Faroe Islands) govern their fisheries in order to help inform policy makers in the UK of the opportunities and challenges of Brexit. What can be learned from these countries and territories? It will also examine how these states engage with European partners to further their interests.

The project will also examine how the repatriation of fisheries policy will impact on the internal constitutional structures of the UK. What significance does this policy area have in understanding the future relationship between the constituent parts of the UK? What will be the intergovernmental mechanisms for governing UK fisheries policy? The recalibration of UK fisheries policy may well be a source of tension between the constituent nations of the UK, with devolved institutions already arguing that they ought to have a greater say on fisheries governance.

Key Dates

December 2017

- Publication of initial analysis into policy lessons from Iceland, Norway and The Faroe Islands that could be applied to post-Brexit fisheries policy.

February 2018

- Publication of full report on policy lessons from Iceland, Norway and The Faroe Islands that could be applied to post-Brexit fisheries policy.
  - The report will examine:
    - External relations
    - Fisheries governance
    - Multilevel governance arrangements
    - Stakeholder engagement

Contact us

Dr Craig McAngus,
University of Aberdeen,
craig.mcangus@abdn.ac.uk

Dr Arno van der Zwet,
University of the West of Scotland,
Arno.van-der-Zwet@uws.ac.uk

Dr John Connolly,
University of the West of Scotland,
John.Connolly@uws.ac.uk

Dr Christopher Huggins,
University of Aberdeen,
christopher.huggins@abdn.ac.uk
UK fisheries policy post-Brexit: multi-level challenges and opportunities
What “Brexit means Brexit” means to citizens

What do people want from the Brexit negotiations?

The Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 gave the government a mandate for Britain to leave the EU. Yet, the options of ‘leave’ or ‘remain’ do not give clear guidance as to what kind of Brexit people want or will accept. This research project addresses this question: which negotiation outcomes will be considered legitimate by the British public?

While the public have voted to leave the EU, it is less clear what that means in terms of policies around key aspects of EU membership. In our project, we examine public opinion on various dimensions of Brexit using an innovative technique for revealing preferences that asks survey respondents to evaluate bundles of negotiation outcomes (conjoint analysis). We conducted a large and nationally representative survey in April 2017, and our results show that:

• While the public is largely indifferent about many aspects of the negotiations, Leave and Remain voters are divided on several key issues.

• Leave voters are particularly concerned about control over immigration and opposed to deals that give Britain less than “full control” over immigration. They are similarly concerned about continued jurisdiction of the ECJ and payment of a “divorce bill” to the EU.

• Remain voters care much more about the rights of EU citizens – indeed, no other aspect of the negotiations appears to matter more to them. They also agree with Leave voters that trade terms with fewer barriers and lower tariffs than a “no deal” scenario would bring are preferable to a hard break from the common market.

• Leave and Remain voters agree that it is desirable with a negotiation outcome that allow EU citizens currently in the UK to stay, that involves a UK-EU trade deal with few barriers to trade in goods and services, and that limits the one-off ‘divorce’ payment by the UK to the EU.

A summary of our preliminary findings can be found at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/08/13/the-british-are-indifferent-about-many-aspects-of-brexit-but-leave-and-remain-voters-are-divided-on-several-key-issues/
Has Brexit led to a new political identity?

We also aim to understand how Brexit has affected political identities and voting behaviour. Specifically, we are interested in how the Brexit vote has given rise to a new political divide. One way to ascertain whether Brexit has created a new fault line in British politics is to ask people whether they “now think of themselves as ‘Leavers’ or ‘Remainers’” and most people do identify in these terms:

In the next part of the project, we will examine these identities in more depth: what is the nature of the new Brexit divide in the electorate and how does this divide shape how people view each other and the political landscape.

Contact us

Professor Sara Hobolt
is Sutherland Chair in European Institutions at the LSE European Institute
S.B.Hobolt@lse.ac.uk

Dr Thomas Leeper
is Associate Professor in Political Behaviour in the Department of Government at the LSE
T.Leeper@lse.ac.uk

Professor James Tilley
is Professor of Politics and Fellow of Jesus College, University of Oxford
james.tilley@politics.ox.ac.uk